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Corruption mitigating policies: the case of Italy 
 
 
 
Abstract One of the circumstances likely to be associated with the intensity of both 
investigative and legislative efforts designed to curb political and bureaucratic corruption 
is institutional reform. Since the characteristics of electoral and party systems seem to be 
associated with variations in the intensity of anti-corruption efforts cross-nationally, it 
was reasonable to think that changes in the characteristics of these systems in Italy in the 
1990s would be reflected in a corresponding change in the efforts of legislators and 
members of the judiciary to tackle corruption. Prior to the 1990s, Italy’s tri-polar party 
system and its numerous concomitants placed considerable obstacles in the way of the 
willingness and the ability of judicial investigators and parliamentarians to deal with the 
corruption emergency. The 1993 electoral-law reform, the eventual emergence of a 
largely bipolar party system, and the circumstances surrounding these processes, 
considerably diminished the significance of the aforementioned obstacles, yet there has 
been little noticeable increase in anti-corruption efforts. This is probably explicable in 
terms of the electoral effects of such efforts, and suggests that institutional change is at 
most only one of a number of conditions that must be fulfilled in order for more 
strenuous efforts to be observed. 
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Introduction 
This article focuses on anti-corruption efforts in Italy, though its purpose is ultimately 
comparative, Italy being taken as a case study in order to explore the conditions under 
which we can expect anti-corruption efforts in liberal democracies to be more or less 
intense. Specifically, we are interested in examining the impact of institutional change on 
the attempts of governments and judicial authorities to curb political and bureaucratic 
corruption. With this in mind, the thoroughgoing electoral and party-system changes that 
took place in that country in the 1990s, suggest that Italy provides the ideal setting for the 
conduct of a sort of ‘quasi-experiment’ of the ‘before-and-after’ variety. By carrying out 
this experiment, we hope thereby to link the Italian case to a larger research agenda. 
 
Although corruption, like poverty, has always been with us1 and, indeed, may always 
be, there are at least two reasons why it is important to ask about the circumstances that 
are likely to give rise to government-sponsored attempts to curb corruption. First, 
corruption has potentially grave and pernicious consequences. It involves the suspension 
of normatively defined criteria for the allocation of resources, in favour of market 
exchanges – whose distributive consequences in turn depend on the arbitrary and unequal 
distribution of money and other resources. By undermining principles of equality and 
transparency, political and bureaucratic corruption is subversive of liberal democracy. It 
inflates the costs of public services and perpetuates administrative inefficiency besides 
being self-reproducing.2 Second, how, and, one might add, under what conditions, actions 
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against corruption take place, can determine the success or failure of those actions 
themselves. 
 
Recognizing that political corruption has in recent years become a powerful enemy of 
good governance around the world,3 a growing number of researchers have explored the 
impact of anti-corruption strategies in an effort to draw conclusions on how best to tackle 
the phenomenon.4 Rather less has been done on the circumstances likely to favour the 
adoption of these strategies in the first place, and what work has been done has tended to 
concentrate on the less developed countries. This may have been due to the perception 
that corruption was largely confined to these countries, together with the perception that 
developed countries had experienced corruption in earlier phases of their development 
and then brought it under control through a variety of reforms. Such perceptions would 
be supported by the broad relationship between levels of corruption and socio-economic 
development as indicated, for example, by Transparency International’s global data.5 
Under these circumstances, the conditions giving rise to anti-corruption efforts were 
probably thought of as already known, and thought of as being such factors traditionally 
associated with economic development as: political democracy, the spread of ‘due-
process’ norms, the pressure of public opinion, and so forth.  
 
Since the early 1990s, there has been an explosion of corruption scandals in 
developed countries. This has been reflected in sometimes quite dramatic changes in 
individual countries’ Corruption Perceptions Index scores6 and a corresponding decline in 
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the confidence with which the aforementioned beliefs about the conditions favouring 
anti-corruption efforts were once held. Such declining confidence can be seen in the 
growing number of conferences, books and journal articles that in recent years have been 
devoted to the topic of corruption in the advanced industrial nations. The investigation of 
anti-corruption strategies in these countries is, therefore, extremely timely. 
 
In focusing on the Italian case, this article begins by considering the conditions likely 
to be associated with greater and lesser efforts to curb corruption. Arguing that there are 
theoretical and empirical reasons for expecting institutional change to affect authorities’ 
responses to corrupt activity, the article then goes on to describe the ways in which 
institutional arrangements tended to diminish the commitment to anti-corruption efforts 
prior to the mid-1990s, as well as the new institutional arrangements that have been put in 
place since then. Noting that these new arrangements, in particular, the 1993 change to 
the parliamentary electoral law and the now largely bipolar party system, do not appear to 
have had the effects expected of them, the final section of the article explores the reasons 
for this. 
  
 
Anti-corruption efforts 
A useful starting point is to define ‘anti-corruption efforts’ and to consider what, a priori, 
appear to be their most proximate causes. In the abstract, anti-corruption efforts would 
seem to belong to one or the other of two categories: the efforts of the police and judicial 
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investigators to bring those suspected of corruption to justice, and the efforts of 
legislators to frame laws designed to prevent corruption taking place to begin with.7  
 
Across democratic countries at any one time, and within a single country over time, 
one would expect the intensity of investigative efforts to vary with at least seven 
interrelated factors: 
 political culture/levels of social capital 
 levels of corruption (its relationship with anti-corruption efforts probably taking the 
form of an inverted ‘U’) 
 resources made available to investigate it 
 public/political pressure to investigate it 
 investigators’ perceptions of the consequences of corruption 
 investigators’ perceptions of the consequences of the exposure of corruption 
 the power of those who would lose from, and therefore resist, anti-corruption efforts 
 
Across democratic countries at any one time, and within a single country over time, 
one would expect the intensity of legislative efforts to prevent corruption to vary with a 
similar set of factors: 
 political culture/levels of social capital 
 levels of corruption 
 public pressure to enact laws to prevent corruption 
 legislators’ perceptions of the consequences of corruption 
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 the power of losers from anti-corruption legislation 
 
All of these variables are in their turn obviously influenced by short-term, macro-
political changes. For example, it is often said that a significant factor in explaining the 
timing of the outbreak of the Tangentopoli (‘Bribe City’) corruption scandal in Italy in 
1992 was the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Investigating magistrates were thus aware that 
for the first time in forty-five years they could attack the misdeeds of a governing class 
among which corruption was widespread without thereby enhancing the risk of the large 
Italian Communist Party coming to power.8 Public and political pressures to combat 
corruption, and therefore the resources made available to investigate it, would also seem 
to be affected by political changes. For example, in Britain, the change of government in 
1997 put the Labour Party under immense pressure to address corruption in local 
councils. For it was aware of the importance of concerns about public standards in the 
downfall of the outgoing Conservatives and thus that some well-publicized instances of 
corruption in Labour-controlled councils made it highly vulnerable to partisan attack.9  
 
There are a number of reasons, therefore, for thinking that the intensity of 
investigative and legislative efforts to combat corruption will be significantly effected by 
macro-political changes. From the current literature on anti-corruption strategies, it would 
seem that such changes can be regarded as belonging to a number of distinct categories. 
First, there are altered pressures and incentives deriving from the international 
environment. The above-mentioned end of Communism was an example. Another 
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example is the initiative of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in adopting an anti-corruption programme from 1989, probably as 
a result of US diplomatic pressure.10 This, it has been suggested, ‘has had a catalytic 
effect and promoted dramatic policy change over the last ten years’.11 By persuading a 
number of countries to agree to its 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials, for example, the OECD also managed to persuade several of the 
signatories, as a logical corollary of the Convention, to alter their domestic legislation to 
deny the tax deductibility of bribes in international business transactions.12 Second, there 
are the catalysts provided by ‘one-off’ political events taking place in the domestic 
environment. These include election outcomes and, most obviously, political scandals. 
The examples are legion and include Watergate and the Foreign and Corrupt Practices 
Act in the United States, and the oil scandal leading to the 1974 party finance law in 
Italy. The occurrence of these kinds of dramatic domestic political events is often 
unpredictable while the nature of their impact is usually straightforward and obvious. 
Typically, they create sudden and intense public pressure for action, to which the 
authorities are obliged to respond as the price of retaining power and authority. For these 
reasons, as causes of anti-corruption activity, they are not particularly interesting. 
 
Far more interesting is a third type of change, namely, institutional change. It is 
frequently argued that some institutional arrangements are more conducive to high levels 
of corruption than are others. For example, where, as has traditionally been the case in 
Italy, administrative procedures are lengthy and complex, public officials acquire a 
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discretion – arising from their power to help citizens overcome and circumvent 
bureaucratic obstacles – which they can then deploy in exchange for bribes. Where the 
public sector is large levels of corruption will be high since the extent to which resources 
are allocated according to political rather than market criteria is also large.13 Likewise, on 
the face of it, it seems reasonable to assume that some institutional arrangements will be 
more conducive to a fight against corruption than are others – if for no other reason than 
that the impact of at least one of the variables listed above (i.e. public pressure) will vary 
with the institutional arrangements through which it is channelled. Consequently, it 
seems reasonable to think that when institutional arrangements change, so will the nature 
and intensity of anti-corruption efforts. The kinds of institutional change we may expect, 
given earlier investigations, to have an impact, include reform of electoral systems, party-
system changes, changes in the distribution of power between central and sub-national 
units of government. In terms of the focus of our discussion, we give priority to these 
types of institutional change over changes in the public administration and the 
relationship between the state and the market because, notwithstanding the fact that the 
latter have emerged as being particularly relevant in the Italian case, they are, as 
mentioned, relevant for levels of corruption. In this piece our concern is with efforts to 
combat corruption.  
 
All other things being equal, democracies where voting takes place by closed-list 
systems of proportional representation are more likely to witness attempts to fight 
corruption than are democracies that have open lists. The reason is that in the former case 
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those who would lose from, and therefore resist, anti-corruption reforms are likely to be 
less numerous and/or powerful. For, with closed-list systems, the voter simply makes a 
choice of party, while the identities of the specific candidates elected are determined by 
the order in which they appear on the party list. Therefore, the individual candidate’s 
chances of being elected are relatively less dependent, than with open-list systems, on 
satisfying his or her party’s nominal supporters and relatively more dependent on the 
party hierarchy, which determines the order of candidates’ list placements. With the 
open-list system, by contrast, voters have the opportunity not just to select a party, but 
also to express preferences among their chosen party’s candidates. Therefore the 
candidate’s chances of being elected depend at least as much on his or her success in 
competing with fellow candidates from the same party as on his or her success in 
competing with candidates from rival parties. Since the degree to which candidates from 
the same party can compete with each other in terms of (broad-based) policy proposals is 
limited (because policy divisions undermine the electoral prospects of all candidates to 
the benefit of those of rival parties) they have an incentive to attempt to outdo each other 
through the provision, to voters, of patronage benefits – which can easily degenerate into 
out-and-out corruption. For this reason we would anticipate finding that the numbers of 
both candidates and voters who stand to lose from clean-up campaigns are higher in 
democracies that have open-, rather than closed-list proportional representation. Hence, 
we would expect to find more intense reform campaigns in democracies with closed-, 
rather than open-list systems of voting.14 Geddes, who investigated civil service reform in 
Latin America, argues that in Colombia and Uruguay voting by closed-list proportional 
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representation facilitated the reform effort – while Brazil and Chile both had open-list 
systems and failed to reform.15 
 
Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman have recently advanced a theoretical argument about 
the effects of electoral rules that is just the reverse of the foregoing.16 In fact, their 
argument is about the impact of electoral rules not on anti-corruption efforts, but on the 
likelihood of candidates and party leaders being corrupt. However, if we make the 
reasonable assumption that there is likely to be a close inverse correlation between the 
intensity of legislative anti-corruption efforts and the extent to which those who must 
initiate them are themselves corrupt, the work of Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman is 
directly relevant to our present concerns. They argue that with closed lists (CLPR) party 
candidates will have relatively few opportunities for corrupt gains (which, if they are 
indulged in, will tend to be monopolized by party leaders) owing to the dependence of the 
electoral prospects of the former on the latter and thus the relative powerlessness of the 
former vis-à-vis the latter. With open lists (OLPR), by contrast, candidates have some 
power to appeal to voters directly, over the heads of party leaders. On the other hand, the 
opportunity to chose between individual candidates offered by OLPR creates a direct 
link, not just between re-election and the party’s candidates’ collective performance, but 
also between the candidates’ individual performances, and their re-election chances. 
Therefore, assuming that corruption imposes costs on citizens in terms of inflated 
budgets, low value public projects and so forth, candidates will have an incentive to avoid 
corruption since voters will punish corrupt politicians by voting against them at the next 
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election. For these reasons, one expects to find fewer corrupt legislators in systems using 
OLPR than in systems using CLPR. Of course, the specific expectations one has about 
one electoral system as compared to another depend very much on the assumptions one 
makes about the opportunities and incentives to which the relevant actors are subject: the 
point to note is simply that we have reason to think that electoral systems do make a 
difference. Later in this article the grounds on which one might reasonably expect the 
change of electoral system in Italy to have made such a difference are spelt out.17 
 
That the characteristics of party systems appear to have an impact on anti-corruption 
efforts is suggested by the examples of nineteenth-century civil-service reform in Britain 
and the United States. Both had two evenly matched parties able to provide single-party 
government and to alternate in power. The reason this facilitated reform has to do with 
the fact that, if reforming parties can gain voting support by advocating change, this has 
to be set against the loss of votes deriving from the reduction in opportunities for corrupt 
exchanges. Any given party advocating reform may therefore suffer a loss of votes to 
rival parties that outweighs any gain deriving from the advocacy of a cleaner system, and 
this is more likely to be the case where its access to corrupt exchanges is greater than that 
of rival parties. Moreover, there is a ‘first-mover disadvantage’ in the sense that the party 
that advocates reform is likely to have to bear higher costs than those that simply go 
along with the change.18 Therefore, in multi-party systems with disproportionate access 
to corrupt exchanges, reforming efforts are likely to be relatively few. On the other hand, 
in two-party systems with regular alternation in power, parties will be evenly matched in 
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terms of their access to corrupt exchanges and if they can collaborate to legislate change 
neither party will lose votes, and both will share in any benefits of reform. For these 
reasons reform is more likely in party systems with these characteristics than in party 
systems of the former type.  
 
Finally, that the distribution of power between central and sub-national units of 
government appears to be a relevant consideration in terms of the likelihood of the 
occurrence of anti-corruption efforts is suggested by the example of nineteenth-century 
America. On the one hand, as the efficiency of government services began to loom large 
in voters’ minds, Federal politicians found that the dispensing of patronage – which also 
consumed much time and energy – eventually became a political cost rather than a 
benefit. On the other hand, patronage was increasingly controlled by state and local party 
bosses whose interests were not necessarily congruent with those of Federal politicians. 
Federal politicians thus supported reform because it was a way for them to reduce the 
power of rivals at lower levels of government.19 
 
The institutional profiles of democratic countries are therefore clearly significant in 
terms of the efforts these countries make to combat corruption. The following section 
describes those features of the institutional set-up in Italy that acted as a break on anti-
corruption efforts and the grounds there were for expecting the institutional changes of 
the 1990s to bring improvement. 
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Anti-corruption efforts in Italy 
Until the 1990s in Italy, legislative efforts to combat corruption were depressed by the 
nature of the country’s party and electoral systems, investigative efforts by low levels of 
autonomy of the judiciary from other political institutions. 
 
Between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, the 
fundamental determinant of coalition formation, underpinned by the widespread popular 
acceptance of anti-Communist attitudes, was the so-called conventio ad excludendum. 
This was the agreement between the remaining parties in the legislature that the second 
largest party and party furthest to the left, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), was 
unacceptable as a coalition partner and should never be admitted to government. 
Likewise, the parliamentary party furthest to the right, the neo-fascist Italian Social 
Movement, was also excluded, and this led to the permanence in office of the centre-
placed Christian Democrats (DC) as the mainstay of all feasible governing coalitions. 
 
This had several significant consequences. First, the DC and its allies knew that their 
agreement to exclude left and right extremes virtually guaranteed them a place in 
government regardless of election outcomes, and thus that the collapse of any 
government (there were over fifty between 1945 and 1992) would be more or less quickly 
followed by the installation of a new government composed of some more or less altered 
combination of the same parties. This meant that they were under little or no pressure to 
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enact coherent legislative programmes and therefore that they were under little pressure 
to construct governments with any real power vis-à-vis the legislature. Consequently, 
senior party leaders with the power to impose discipline on their followers tended not 
themselves to be cabinet ministers but rather to delegate these positions to secondary 
figures. And the fact that it was not prime ministers, but the powerful party secretaries 
who chose their cabinet colleagues, quite naturally meant that the former had little 
authority. 
 
Second, the weakness of prime ministers and executives meant that not only were 
governments, and the parties staffing them, under little pressure to enact coherent 
legislative programmes, but that they had little power to do so either. Consequently, 
whilst the main basis of support for the governing parties in their competition with the 
main party of opposition was ideological (that is, anti-communism) small-scale 
distributive measures, allowing them to establish clientele relationships with their 
followers, became the parties’ preferred means of mobilizing and retaining electoral 
support in competition among themselves. Thus the substance of negotiations leading to 
the formation of governments essentially concerned how the various ministries and 
under-secretarial positions were to be distributed among parties anxious to control them 
for patronage purposes. Thus did the parties penetrate vast areas of the state and society - 
a state of affairs that came to be dubbed partitocrazia or ‘partyocracy’. 
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Third, knowing that they would always be the mainstay of any feasible governing 
coalition, the Christian Democrats were highly factionalized, and given partitocrazia, the 
main basis for factional conflict tended to be the distribution of patronage resources 
rather than ideology or policy. This was reinforced by the electoral system, which was of 
the open-list variety described above and which allowed the voter to express up to four 
preferences among his or her chosen party’s list of candidates. 
 
Fourth, the Communists’ exclusion meant, paradoxically, that their legislative 
behaviour tended to be ‘responsible’, where ‘responsible’ here means an only partly 
visible tendency to collaborate in the functioning of partitocrazia and in the passage of 
patronage-based measures. On the one hand, the depth of the ideological divide 
separating the Communists from other parties meant that the PCI was engaged in a 
perpetual search for its own legitimacy as the only means of extending its electoral 
support beyond its heartlands. On the other hand, the precariousness of coalition 
solidarity often meant that the passage of legislation would come to depend on the 
support or abstention of one or more of the non-governing parties. Moreover, article 72 of 
the Constitution enables Parliament with few exceptions to give law-making authority to 
its committees – except that the ‘committee only’ route can be overridden at the request 
of one tenth of the members of the house in question, in which case the bill concerned 
must be referred back to the plenary session. Both of these features gave the Communist 
opposition considerable power to block the patronage-based legislation of which it 
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rhetorically disapproved. Declining to do so gave it a valuable means of providing proof 
of its ‘responsible’ intentions. 
 
In this situation, there were at least two reasons why the Italian parties were unable to 
carry on any really committed legislative offensive against corruption. For one thing, the 
governing parties’ reliance on patronage and small-scale distributive measures as the 
main basis on which they sought support had the consequence of entrenching a large 
number of vested interests, each of which had a power of veto whenever policy change 
was considered. Clientelism and patronage therefore reinforced still further the inability 
of the system to respond to popular demands through coherent policy making.  
 
For another thing, given the emergence of a number of factors stimulating both the 
demand for, and the supply of corrupt exchanges from round about the mid-1970s,20 
clientelism itself facilitated the spread of political corruption to the point where it 
eventually became systemic. Since clientelism represents a denial of the value of 
universalism, namely, ‘the principle that all persons should be evaluated in the same way, 
regardless of who they might be’,21 those whose power depends on it face lower moral 
costs in resorting to illegality to defend their positions whenever these are threatened. If 
they do decide to resort to illegality, then the corrupt exchange presents itself as a 
possibility that has much in common with the patron-client relationship. The positions 
that allow their incumbents to patronize clients frequently provide access to the resources 
that can provide the basis for corrupt exchanges. The acceptance of bribes, in its turn, 
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offered the means of acquiring even larger clientele followings so that clientelism and 
corruption tended to be mutually reinforcing. As is often remarked, once networks of 
corruption have become established, they then tend to spread in a self-generating way. 
Consequently, by the early 1990s, the parties that had ruled Italy since the War had 
essentially been transformed into organizations for the carrying on of mutually profitable 
exchanges and the construction of alliances between economic and political potentates 
willing to stop at nothing to achieve their objectives. Corrupt parties are not generally 
known to be the most zealous when it comes to trying to tackle corruption. In such 
circumstances, anti-corruption laws are a deterrent, not to corruption itself but to attempts 
to break the silence and the networks of connivance that allow corrupt exchanges to be 
carried on undisturbed. For in such circumstances, the laws allow the possession of 
compromising information about one’s colleagues to be used as a sword of Damocles 
whereby ‘blackmail becomes one invisible source of cement for a political class 
condemned to a lengthy and forced cohabitation’.22 
  
The possibility of any very strenuous investigative efforts being made to combat 
corruption was compromised by very similar factors. In Italy, when suspicions arise that 
a criminal act has been committed, the matter is reported to a public prosecutor, who is 
responsible for gathering and analyzing evidence with the object of ascertaining whether 
there are sufficient grounds to warrant proceeding to a trial. From one perspective, public 
prosecutors have considerable power and of course there are plenty of examples of 
attempts by them to use their power to combat corruption a long time before the famous 
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Mani pulite (‘Clean hands’) investigations that led to the Tangentopoli scandal of the 
early 1990s. Their power derives from three things: first, the considerable independence 
they have, both from other prosecutors’ offices and other branches of the state, to decide 
what to investigate and what charges, if any, to press.23 Article 112 of the Constitution 
obliges them to prosecute all cases that come to their attention, but the volume of work 
makes this impossible while the article makes it possible for them to initiate 
investigations, not only on request from external bodies, but also on their own initiative 
in relation to crimes they think may have been committed.24 Second, public prosecutors 
belong to the same profession as trial judges – that is, both are part of a single judicial 
corps administered by the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (High Council of the 
Judiciary, CSM) – and this, it is often suggested, allows for an imperfect separation 
between the roles of judge and prosecutor. This point requires some explaining. 
 
At the end of his or her investigations – known as the ‘instruction phase’ – the public 
prosecutor applies to a judge – the so-called giudice dell’udienza preliminare (literally, 
‘judge of the preliminary hearing’) – with the request either that the case be closed or that 
it be taken to trial.25 At the trial there is no jury – inadmissible in the Italian legal system 
‘because the unreasoned verdict of the traditional jury would fail to comply with the 
constitutional requirement that all judicial decisions must be reasoned’.26 Second, 
proceedings tend to be dominated by the results of the instruction phase since the main 
body of evidence on which the court bases its decision is the written evidence emerging 
from the instruction phase and – so it is often argued – the court may not be in a position 
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to know what weight to give to the interpretative and filtering processes of the author of 
that evidence. Hence the claim that there is an imperfect separation between judge and 
prosecutor. On the one hand, trial proceedings are so overshadowed by the results of the 
previous phase that they are said to represent little more than its ‘formal confirmation’;27 
on the other hand, public prosecutors and trial judges belong to the same body and often 
work in neighbouring offices.28 This it is argued, often allows members of the judiciary to 
use their offices for political purposes by virtue of the risk that the perceptions as to guilt 
or innocence held by the judicial officer in his or her role as prosecutor so influence the 
view of the case that his or her colleagues take in their roles as judges, that the 
proceedings are heavily influenced from the outset. 
 
The third feature of the judicial system enhancing the powers of public prosecutors is 
the room for discretion that is given to them by the sheer number of laws on the statute 
books and by the vagueness with which some criminal offences are defined.29  
 
Precisely because of their powers, public prosecutors tended to become the target of 
individual politicians and political parties keen to ‘have friends’ in the judiciary in order 
to avoid themselves becoming the targets of judicial initiatives.30 Thus it was that 
politicians were able to establish informal relations of connivance with individual 
members of the judiciary by exploiting certain hierarchical features of the judiciary’s 
internal organization. For example, the work of public prosecutors’ offices is directed by 
judges of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Cassation whose responsibility it is, among 
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other things, to assign cases to the individual prosecutors working under them. Directors 
of public prosecutors’ offices have the power to remove individual prosecutors from 
specific cases on grounds of ‘grave impediment’ or ‘significant reasons of service’. 
Likewise, when cases are ready to be brought to trial, decisions have to made about the 
individual judges to whom to assign them (decisions usually made by the Presidents of 
the courts in question, the Presidents themselves being appointed by the CSM). Each 
court, and its associated public prosecutor’s office, has jurisdiction over a defined 
geographical area, except that the Court of Cassation can, for example, move trials from a 
given jurisdiction ‘when security or public safety or the freedom of decision-making of 
the persons involved are prejudiced by serious local circumstances such as to disturb the 
trial and not otherwise eliminable’.31 Prosecutors General associated with the Appeal 
Court can take over cases from public prosecutors on the grounds that, when requesting 
that cases be brought to trial or else closed, the public prosecutors have failed to act 
according to the terms established by law. Such procedures all created a number of points 
at which political pressures could be brought to bear. Emblematic of such pressures was 
the epithet that came to be associated with the Rome public prosecutor’s office whose 
capacity to use all kinds of mysterious means to ‘bury’ politically sensitive cases and 
prevent them from coming to trial earned it the name of the ‘foggy port’. The collusion 
that took place between individual politicians and members of the judiciary was well 
symbolized by the case of Claudio Vitalone: 
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According to the boss of the Roman DC Vittorio Sbardella, the career of Claudio 
Vitalone, ex-magistrate, senator and DC minister closely associated with Andreotti, 
resulted from a transaction between the two men: ‘Since Vitalone had no electoral 
or political support of his own he got Andreotti’s support by performing miracles in 
order to get him politically advantageous results by judicial means. What I mean is 
you can do something which will gain the appreciation of a politician either by 
judicial favours for their friends and supporters or, on the other hand, damaging 
political personalities who might inconvenience your friend judicially’… Claudio 
Martelli, justice minister in Andreotti’s final government, stated: ‘Claudio Vitalone 
was a man very close to Andreotti who had, at the same time, considerable 
influence in Roman judicial circles; not just in the Roman Public Prosecutor’s 
office but also among judging magistrates and the Court of Cassation. You could 
say that Vitalone was the ‘long arm’ of Andreotti in judicial circles’.32 
 
Such relationships should not occasion surprise. Moving in the same social circles; 
sitting on the same government committees; having the same cultural outlooks, members 
of parliament and senior members of the judiciary would often be personally acquainted. 
That this could often give rise to the sense that, cutting across professional distinctions, 
there were common interests to be defended, was testified to by the membership list of 
the P2 masonic lodge. Besides those of the heads of the secret services, various army 
officers, bankers, journalists, ambassadors and members of Parliament, the list also 
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contained the names of eighteen high-ranking members of the judiciary, including a 
former vice-President of the CSM. 
 
Collusion between politicians and judicial investigators was encouraged by three 
further features of the judiciary: first, the lack of prolonged training prior to entry and the 
lack of any separation in the careers of trial judges and prosecutors. These factors 
prevented the development of ‘a coherent set of values concerning...professional integrity 
and ethos’ leading, instead, to ‘a corporatist logic according to which the judiciary…tried 
to oppose any measure which could reduce…[its] “privileges” and status…’33 These 
circumstances in turn made it difficult for members of the judiciary to remain free of the 
political dynamics of other institutions, notably the political parties whose support they 
sought in opposing undesired measures. 
 
Second, from round about the early 1970s, the process of generational turnover meant 
that the conservatism of public prosecutors and judges who had been socialized under 
Fascism gave way, in a large number of cases, to a new ‘protagonism’ on the part of 
younger members of the judiciary who, far from seeing their role as being to act as a 
passive bouche de la loi,34 adopted a far more active stance and – through penal 
initiatives in the areas of workplace safety, environmental pollution, tax evasion, fraud 
and so forth – sought to act as problem solvers, attempting to tackle the great social 
issues of the day.35 In a number of celebrated instances, such initiatives were 
‘inconvenient’ or embarrassing for members of the political class. For example, in 1981 
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judicial investigations surrounding the masonic lodge P2 and the collapse of the Banco 
Ambrosiano, revealed that the banker and P2 member, Roberto Calvi, had made illegal 
payments of 7 million dollars to the Socialist Party. In July 1981, Calvi was sentenced to 
four years in prison for his part in the Banco Ambrosiano collapse. The violent reactions 
of politicians to Calvi’s arrest included calls for political controls over the activities of 
public prosecutors. 
 
Third, the fact that 20 of the 33 members of the CSM were, from 1975, elected by 
members of the judiciary as a whole whatever their rank, gave rise to a tendency for it to 
take decisions according to political, rather than hierarchical, criteria. Thus most 
members of the judiciary belonged to one of four organized factions each of which had a 
clearly identifiable location on the left-right spectrum.36 Consequently, though the 
factions were not formally linked to the parties, matters such as the distribution of 
resources, disciplinary sanctions and transfers from one judicial office to another became 
highly political issues on which individual members of the judiciary had an incentive to 
ally themselves with one party or the other. Given all of this, political parties were often 
able to influence, through the judicial factions closest to them ideologically, ‘the 
assignment of magistrates to various posts and in particular the choice of the heads of 
judicial offices’.37 The judiciary, for its part, was so highly politicized, that its members 
were often willing to turn a blind eye to acts of corruption in order to maintain their 
privileges. Many prosecutors  
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tried to break such a system but [were] always blocked during their investigations 
either by indirect political pressures on high level judges or by the non-
cooperation of other colleagues. Thus…not all members of the judiciary [were] 
inactive, but…it was sufficient to have the key positions ‘covered’ to neutralize 
most efforts.38 
 
This is not the place to discuss in detail the so-called ‘judges’ revolution’ or the other 
causes of the 1990s institutional changes that transformed the situation we have described 
hitherto. Suffice it to say that by the end of the 1980s, judicial activities had come to 
express the influence of two contradictory forces: on the one hand, judicial assertiveness 
on the part of younger magistrates who tended to reject the notion that legal interpretation 
could be reduced ‘to a purely formalistic activity indifferent to the substance and the 
actual impact of the law on the life of the country’;39 on the other hand, the subjection of 
such activities to frequent, strenuous and meticulous efforts by the political class to 
ensure that they were carried on under an informal system of political tutelage that would 
prevent damage to the interests of the politically powerful. From this point of view, the 
Tangentopoli scandal is fruitfully interpreted as the outcome of a successful effort to 
break the system of political tutelage, one whose timing is to be explained by such factors 
as: the end of the Cold War (meaning that investigating magistrates could now expose the 
misdeeds of the governing class without the risk that in so doing they would enhance the 
likelihood of the PCI – which had always made the so-called moral question one of its 
own great battle cries – coming to power); growing popular discontent with the 
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incapacity of the governing parties to engage in coherent policy-making (meaning that 
the power of politicians to manipulate proceedings using their contacts within the 
judiciary to avoid personally undesirable outcomes was reduced); the emergence of the 
‘Maastricht constraint’ (meaning that the cost of bribes could no longer be financed 
through increases in public indebtedness). 
 
 Tangentopoli eventually led to the complete organizational disintegration of all the 
traditional parties of government. Meanwhile, the early 1990s also saw the emergence of 
a cross-party movement for reform that sought – successfully – to engineer a change in 
the electoral law for the two chambers of parliament by exploiting the constitutional 
provision that allows the holding of referenda on laws and parts of laws when requested 
by means of a petition of at least half a million electors. By forcing a change from a 
proportional, to a largely single-member, simple plurality system, thus obliging parties to 
form electoral coalitions whose leaders would be natural candidates for the premiership, 
reformers hoped that the new system – which provides for three quarters of the members 
of each chamber to be elected according to the plurality system, only one quarter, 
proportionally – would mean voters being presented with a straightforward choice 
between a coalition of the Left and of the Right.40 This would allow them directly to 
determine both the composition of the government and the identity of the prime minister 
who, in virtue of the receipt of a popular mandate and competition from the opposition, 
would enjoy sufficient authority to be able to impose discipline on the governing 
coalition. Consequently, it was hoped that in place of the old system of governance, 
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based, as it had been, on unstable coalitions whose composition owed more to ‘behind-
the-scenes’ negotiations after the votes had been counted than to the voting choices of 
citizens, the changed electoral law might bring with it greater governmental stability, 
responsiveness and popular accountability. 
 
In terms of the most salient characteristics of the party system, the hopes of reformers 
have been broadly fulfilled. No longer is the centre of the political spectrum occupied by 
a single party able to exclude left and right extremes; and the party system as a whole has 
shed its old tri-polar format and been replaced by a bipolar configuration based on two 
broad electoral coalitions – one of the centre-left, the other of the centre-right – both 
competing to win absolute majorities of parliamentary seats. While the new electoral law 
has provided the framework of rules for three general elections (those of 1994, 1996 and 
2001), the most recent election has seen the further consolidation of a predominantly 
majoritarian and bipolar dynamic to party competition. For the first time since the War it 
resulted in the defeat of an incumbent government seeking re-election, by a pre-
constituted opposition coalition that was successful in winning absolute majorities of 
seats in both chambers of parliament. 
 
Typically in such circumstances, and for as long as alternation in office remains a 
realistic possibility, the fortunes of the governing majority are dependent on their success 
in implementing a coherent programme of policies. Meanwhile, the presence of a single 
opposition coalition seeking to take the government’s place ensures that the prospects of 
 27 
any one of the governing parties individually are closely bound to the success or failure 
of the government as a whole. Given this situation, and given the divorce of the judicial 
and party systems mentioned above, it was reasonable to expect to find much more 
strenuous efforts being made to combat corruption than was possible prior to the early 
1990s. The extent to which this has been the case is considered in the next section. 
 
 
Italy’s anti-corruption efforts in the 1990s 
In considering legislative measures to tackle corruption, it will be most relevant to 
examine what happened from the date of the 1996 election onwards. The legislature 
inaugurated by this election lasted for the full parliamentary term of five years. The 
legislature inaugurated by the election prior to that had seen two governments whose time 
in office and, in the second case, mandate had been too limited for any significant reform 
to be possible. It is also necessary to bear in mind what is to count as an ‘anti-corruption 
measure’. Some measures are passed with the specific purpose of dealing with 
corruption; others may have the effect of reducing corruption as an incidental side effect 
of other intentions. 
 
Della Porta and Vannucci argue that the thirteenth legislature, elected in 1996, was 
the first parliament to attempt to tackle the corruption emergency in any incisive way.41 
However, given that the authors later remark that the measures adopted were ‘few’ and 
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‘ambiguous’,42 this must be taken more as a comment on the poor performance of earlier 
parliaments than an expression of appreciation of the activities of this one. 
 
The first measure, taken by the Chamber of Deputies, was the setting up, in 
September 1996, of a special Commission with the remit of preparing, for the 
consideration of the Chamber, new legislative proposals for the prevention and repression 
of acts of corruption. This considered a number of proposals but was given a limited 
amount of time within which to fulfil its remit (and the Commission was not revived by 
the legislature elected in 2001). Consequently, two months after its mandate expired at 
the end of March 1998, only two new proposals had been approved by the Chamber. Of 
these, the one concerning ‘The relationship between criminal and disciplinary 
proceedings against public employees’ was modified by the Senate (the two chambers of 
Parliament have co-equal legislative powers) and only given final parliamentary approval 
on 8 March 2001 – the very day the legislature came to the end of its life through the 
dissolution of Parliament and the calling of fresh elections!43 The other proposal, 
‘Measures for the prevention of corruption’, never became law, falling instead victim to 
lengthy processes of amendment in the two chambers and then finally, it seems, to the 
decisions of the parliamentary group leaders whose responsibility it is to allot space to 
proposals within the parliamentary timetable.44 
 
Both proposals attempted to reduce the probability of acts of corruption occurring by 
containing provisions designed to raise the probability of being caught and once caught, 
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of being punished. Two further proposals (initiated not by the anti-corruption 
Commission but by the Government) took the opposite approach of reducing the 
opportunities for corrupt exchanges to begin with by seeking to simplify administrative 
procedures. These proposals became law in 1997.45 Clearly, one would assume that the 
elimination of bureaucratic complexity would necessarily reduce the scope for officials to 
enter into corrupt exchanges through the sale of special, ‘fast-track’, modes of access to 
the processes of public decision-making. However, whatever effects the laws may in fact 
have had, such effects were probably a secondary consideration insofar as, in passing the 
laws, the main objectives of legislators (moved by an awareness of the handicap imposed 
on Italian competitiveness in the European single market by a bureaucratic public sector) 
were to streamline the public administration rather than to deal with corruption as such. 
 
If the legislative activity described hitherto is not, then, evocative of an idea that 
parliamentarians were particularly enthusiastic about fighting corruption, it is possible, in 
addition, to cite initiatives that if anything evoke the opposite impression. Among these, 
della Porta and Vannucci mention: 
 proposals discussed in the anti-corruption Commission to decriminalize financial 
contributions made by individuals to political parties but not declared in the parties’ 
accounts; 
 proposals discussed in the anti-corruption Commission to circumscribe the law on 
false accounting rendering punishable only acts of ‘gross’ falsification; 
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 the reduction, in July 1997, in the penalties attaching to cases of abuse of office for 
financial gain and the contemporaneous abolition of the offence altogether where the 
purpose is other than financial gain; 
 the reform, in August 1997, of article 513 of the penal code in such a way as to render 
inadmissible as evidence, defendants’ statements incriminating others in the course of 
criminal investigations, where the defendants subsequently refuse to confirm the 
statements in court.46 
 
Of the above four initiatives, a variant of the second actually became law a few 
months after the election of 2001. This election brought to office a prime minister who, 
with five criminal proceedings underway against him when he was elected, obtained and 
has since attempted to use, legislative power to change criminal law and procedure to 
which, as a citizen, he is subject. Far from stemming corruption, the resulting proposals 
and enactments seem likely to feed it both by virtue of their attack on principles of 
universalism and even-handedness in the service of the Prime Minister’s own personal 
interests, and by the way in which several of them add to the severe handicaps of the 
Italian judicial system in its efforts to bring to justice criminals of all types owing to the 
slowness of investigation and trial procedures. Such slowness derives, first, from the so-
called ‘obbligo d’azione penale’ (the obligation to initiate penal action) embodied in the 
aforementioned article 112 of the Constitution and which means that a huge weight of 
cases are under consideration at any one time;47 and, second, from the existence of two 
layers of appeal to which defendants may have recourse as of right.48 As a consequence, 
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many cases have simply to be dropped because they cannot be completed before the 
statute of limitations takes effect. This has led Piercamillo Davigo, one of the most high-
profile prosecutors involved in the Mani pulite investigations, to go as far as to claim, in 
relation to corruption, that ‘the concrete probability of a criminal facing conviction, is 
risible’.49 
 
The proposals introduced, and the measures passed by Parliament since the 2001 
election include: 
 the passage of a law (law no. 366/01) , on 3 October 2001, authorising the 
government to introduce secondary legislation substantially decriminalizing a range 
of types of false accounting of which the Prime Minister himself stood accused.  
 the passage, on 5 October 2001, of retroactive legislation (law no. 367/01) whereby 
the conditions that would have to be met for evidence gathered abroad to be 
admissible in Italian criminal proceedings, were considerably tightened. It was widely 
predicted that this would assist a number of high-profile defendants in corruption 
trials, including the Prime Minister’s lawyer, Cesare Previti (who was, however, 
found guilty in the Imi-Sir case in April 2003), by so lengthening trials that charges 
would eventually have to be dropped under the statute of limitations as explained 
above. 
 At the end of February 2002 the Chamber of Deputies agreed to proposed legislation 
supposedly to deal with the conflict of interests involved in Berlusconi’s position as 
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Prime Minister and owner of a controlling stake in Italy’s three largest private 
television stations – but widely seen as bogus.50 
 On 1 August 2002, the Senate agreed to the so-called ‘Cirami Bill’ (after its original 
sponsor Melchiorre Cirami) allowing a defendant to ask the Court of Cassation to 
transfer proceedings against them to another court on grounds of ‘legitimate 
suspicion’ concerning the impartiality of the judges involved in trying the case. 
Rushed through Parliament, which gave its final approval in November (law no. 
248/02), the Bill was widely suspected of being driven by the desire to allow 
Berlusconi’s lawyers to delay proceedings against him in the Sme-Ariosto corruption 
trial whose judges were expected to give a verdict shortly thereafter. Nando dalla 
Chiesa, son of the Carabinieri chief, General Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, murdered by 
the Mafia in 1982, has argued that in organised crime trials (often empirically linked 
with corruption and which often have tens, if not hundreds of defendants) the effects 
of Cirami will be particularly devastating, allowing the presentation of multiple 
transfer requests one after the other, thus reducing trials to a state of paralysis.51 
 12 August 2002 saw the publication of a Bill, sponsored by Forza Italia (FI) Deputy 
Giancarlo Pittelli. This envisaged, among other things, obliging investigating 
magistrates to inform a suspect that they were under investigation as soon as a file 
was opened on them – a provision which, prominent members of the judiciary argued, 
would, if the measure were passed, allow suspects to destroy evidence because it 
removed the secrecy from investigations. 
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 When, in February 2003, the Court of Cassation rejected Berlusconi’s appeal under 
the Cirami Law to have his trial moved from Milan, the Prime Minister launched a 
virulent attack on the judiciary insisting that he would press on with sweeping 
reforms of the justice system. Shortly afterwards the government published proposals 
giving immunity from prosecution for any type of offence to the President of the 
Republic, the President of the Constitutional Court, the presidents of the two 
chambers of Parliament and the Prime Minister for the duration of their terms of 
office – proposals that were approved by Parliament on 20 June (law no. 140/03).  
 
It may be safely suggested that if passed, the Pittelli proposal in particular would 
make more difficult the efforts of judicial investigators seeking to tackle corruption – 
already made difficult by the fact that the relevant legislation is characterised by an 
excessively large number of different species of crime, distinguishing, for example, 
between the crimes of corruption and extortion; between corruption committed on one’s 
own behalf or on behalf of others; between corruption involving a public official and that 
involving persons engaged in public services, and so forth – with the result that judicial 
investigators are obliged to invest considerable amounts of time in trying to establish 
under which laws they can bring their intended prosecutions. Moreover, the existing 
legislation fails to cover situations in which bribes are paid, not for a specific service, but 
rather, as a form of ‘protection’ paid as a general retainer for the corrupt services of 
public officials. Nor does it take account of the fact that the corrupt relationship between 
an entrepreneur and a public official is often not a direct one, but rather is entered into via 
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a party functionary who then undertakes to ‘insure’ the entrepreneur in his multiple 
dealings with the state. It is a reasonable supposition therefore, that proposals such as 
those of Pittelli not only undermine the effectiveness of judicial action but also the 
enthusiasm for it in the first place precisely because the achievement of a ‘successful 
outcome’ (meaning the conviction of suspects in this case) is so difficult. Therefore, the 
large number of initiatives, taken since Tangentopoli, whose effects, perceived or real, 
intended or unintended, act in the direction of making the work of judicial investigators 
more difficult, suggests that the strenuousness, not only of legislative efforts, but also of 
judicial/investigative efforts, may have failed to increase in the wake of the institutional 
changes of the mid-1990s.52 
 
A further piece of evidence pointing in this direction concerns the growing campaign 
of denigration of the activities of the judiciary, by politicians of the centre right, since the 
outbreak of Tangentopoli. As we have seen, a concatenation of events in the early 1990s 
led judicial investigators to break free of the political constraints that had until then 
frequently conditioned their work. One of the reasons why they were successful in 
initiating investigations into so many individuals at the time of Tangentopoli was because 
they were able to use preventative custody laws to create for suspects a kind of 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ – leading to a veritable rush on the part of politicians, 
administrators and entrepreneurs, to confess the part they had played in networks of 
corrupt exchange.53 In these circumstances the judiciary’s new-found independence must 
have seemed, to not a few politicians, a particularly threatening development. It is 
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undoubtedly this that explains the increasingly shrill reactions of politicians whenever, in 
the period since Tangentopoli, the news of some new investigation, or progress in an 
existing investigation, has broken into the public domain. Politicians’ reactions have 
centred around the idea that judicial investigators are politically motivated, using their 
powers to damage politicians with whom they disagree. The Prime Minister himself has 
been especially shrill in his denunciation of investigations into allegations against him, as 
the work of communist sympathisers who have been using the judicial system ‘to 
eliminate political adversaries, riding rough-shod over the law, due process and reality 
itself, by means of contrived investigations, witnesses invented ad hoc, contradictory 
accusations, farcical trials and monstrous sentences’.54 The constant repetition of these 
sorts of claims has had a significant effect on public opinion – at the time of Tangentopoli 
almost unanimous in its support for what the judiciary was doing, now much more 
divided, and in a significant proportion of cases definitely hostile, in its attitudes towards 
the institution – thus confirming that public support for the judiciary has always been 
fragile and highly changeable (largely because, in terms of the stratagem it makes 
available to those with the resources to sustain long trials as compared to those of more 
modest means, the legal system frequently does fall short of the obligation to ensure 
equality before the law). Most importantly, the centre-right politicians’ allegations have 
deprived the judiciary of an important public-opinion ally, something whose effects on 
morale would appear to have been significant. Members of the judiciary have felt 
besieged by the criticisms levelled against them – so much so that in 2002 and 2003, the 
ceremonial openings of the judicial year were marked by judges’ protests against 
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government proposals for judicial reform (the senior Milan public prosecutor, Francesco 
Saverio Borelli, calling on the judiciary to ‘resist, resist, resist’).  
 
Finally, a third piece of evidence relevant to the strenuousness of judicial anti-
corruption efforts concerns the numbers of judicial investigators who are themselves 
caught up in allegations of corruption. The judiciary may be thought of as the ‘natural 
adversary’ of those involved in corrupt exchanges – but of course it itself is exposed to 
the danger of corruption as its power to apply sanctions gives it a resource that is one of 
the kinds most frequently sold for bribes. The involvement of its members in corrupt 
exchanges will have a negative impact on its ability to prosecute suspects. Therefore 
figures showing the numbers of magistrates who are themselves under investigation for 
acts of corruption and related crimes can stand as an additional indicator of the 
strenuousness of judicial anti-corruption efforts. We have no evidence that these numbers 
have significantly decreased in recent years.55 
 
In short, the institutional changes of the mid-1990s have not been reflected in any 
noticeable change in the amount of effort the authorities are able or willing to make to 
curb the extent of corruption in Italy. True, the evidence for this conclusion is largely 
impressionistic and we lack robust indicators with which to quantify it. Nevertheless, 
indicators of a sort do exist. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is 
compiled by combining the results of multiple surveys of business people, academics and 
financial analysts who are asked to rank countries according to how corrupt they perceive 
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them to be. The resulting index ranges from zero to ten where the closer to ten a 
country’s score is, the ‘cleaner’ it is presumed to be.56 Since this is a corruption 
perceptions index, had a determined effort to fight corruption been made following the 
institutional changes of the mid-1990s, we might reasonably have expected to find a 
significant improvement in Italy’s score by virtue of this fact alone. Since they run from 
4.86 in 1980-85 to 5.2 in 2002 – an increase of just 0.34 – the scores provide precious 
little evidence of this. The final section considers what might explain the failure of the 
mid-1990s institutional and party-system changes to have the effects expected of them.  
 
 
Explaining the lack of improvement in anti-corruption efforts 
We expect party systems of the kind Italy had prior to the 1990s to result in efforts to 
tackle the problem of corruption less strenuous than those that are made in bipolar 
systems of the kind Italy now has. The reason is that in tri-polar systems, with bilateral 
oppositions, the oppositions may gain by advocating anti-corruption measures, but in 
order for one or other of them to succeed in displacing the governing parties by so doing, 
the shift of votes will have to be large and predominantly in one direction. In bipolar 
systems, on the other hand, a governing majority’s failure to tackle corruption directly 
increases the probability of its being displaced by the opposition while its commitment to 
doing so reduces such probability. However, this is only true if the numbers of corrupt 
individuals and those who in some way benefit from corrupt exchanges (whose votes 
may be lost by anti-corruption measures) are outweighed by the votes to be gained by 
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advocating such measures. Moreover, even if this is the case, the advocacy of anti-
corruption measures may still have electoral costs. For the time and resources they 
require necessarily detract from the time and resources the authorities are able to devote 
to other activities whose impact on votes may be even greater. This suggests that the 
reason why there have been few significant improvements in the seriousness with which 
corruption is dealt with despite Italy’s party-system change is that the net impact on votes 
of attempts to deal with it is either negative or at least not very largely positive. Several 
pieces of evidence point in the direction of the latter possibility. 
 
First, in aggregate, the Italian electorate has a rather low propensity to shift the 
distribution of its vote between the two coalitions of centre left and centre right from one 
election to the next. Both the 1996 victory of the centre left and the 2001 victory of the 
centre right were essentially a consequence of the effectiveness of the party-alliance 
strategies pursued by the two coalitions rather than of any significant changes in the 
proportion of votes won by each.57 This aggregate stability is underpinned by stability at 
the individual level.58 A question therefore remains about whether there is a sufficiently 
large number of voters able and willing to switch their votes to make alternation between 
coalitions of the centre left and centre right a realistic possibility in most ordinary 
circumstances. If this is not the case, then the fundamental assumption underlying 
expectations of a beneficial effect of bipolar systems, namely, that governments are 
obliged to behave in certain ways by the dynamics of party competition, thereby loses its 
validity. 
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Second, even if voters are able and willing to switch their votes, a bipolar system may 
not have the beneficial effects expected of it if voters’ choices are not an exogenous 
variable. That is, the assumption that public opinion places governments under pressure 
to attack corruption is not a valid one if, instead of responding to public demands, parties 
have the power to change or ‘manipulate’ public opinion in such a way that a response is 
unnecessary. As we have seen, there is evidence of this having been the case in Italy, the 
change in opinion having been the consequence, it would seem, of the aforementioned 
attacks on the judiciary on the part of politicians. For example, della Porta and Vannucci 
cite the results of a survey, carried out in 1998. While 34.1 per cent of respondents 
expressed the belief that the conflict between magistrates and politicians was due to 
politicians’ desire to escape punishment for acts of wrong-doing, 29.1 per cent thought it 
had to do with a desire on the part of the judiciary to interfere with the sphere of politics. 
Moreover, 42.5 per cent thought that the judiciary treated with undue favour those 
belonging to particular social groups, while 43.5 per cent felt that the administration of 
justice depended on the professionalism and the personality of individual judges – who 
were, however, often dishonest or incompetent.59 Politicians’ attempts to change public 
opinion might have been less successful had their attacks on the judges all come from just 
one of the two main coalitions, with representatives of the other coalition offering a 
strenuous defence of the judiciary’s attempts to tackle corruption. This is, however, far 
from having been the case. While criticisms of the judiciary have come principally from 
the current Prime Minister and his governing party, FI, some of the opposition parties 
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have been distinctly ambiguous in their attitudes (principally, it would seem, because 
they are the ‘heirs’ of parties whose leading spokespersons were high-profile defendants 
at the time of Tangentopoli).  
 
Third, at the time of the 2001 election, there were significant numbers of voters for 
whom corruption and allegations of corruption apparently cut little or no ice. Though 
there is evidence that the opposition parties gained votes by ‘demonising’ him,60 
impressionistically, Silvio Berlusconi’s quest to become Prime Minister was hardly 
damaged at all by the allegations of tax fraud, false accounting and links with the Mafia 
that were frequently levelled against him. This may have something to do with a 
significant feature of Italian political culture, namely, a more or less deeply rooted feeling 
of diffidence and mistrust towards the institutions of the state – something that is 
underpinned by low levels of interpersonal trust in general. The results of the 2001 Italian 
National Election Study confirmed the findings of surveys carried out over a period of 30 
years when they revealed that 74.1 per cent of respondents believed that ‘One can never 
be too cautious in one’s dealings with other people’ – as compared to only 24.2 per cent 
prepared to endorse the view, ‘One can trust most people’.61 Italy therefore enjoys 
relatively low levels of social capital and in such circumstances it is reasonable to assume 
that individuals will be less scandalized by revelations of corruption than will be the case 
where levels of social capital are higher. And where the sense of moral outrage provoked 
by given acts is relatively weak, so there may we expect levels of public pressure to do 
something about them to be correspondingly weak. 
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Conclusion 
We are left to conclude, therefore, that while institutional change is not a necessary 
condition for the initiation of vigorous anti-corruption efforts in liberal democracies, it is 
not a sufficient condition either. If our findings from the Italian case have any relevance 
for liberal democracies generally, then they suggest that electoral- and party-system 
changes can only have the effects expected of them given the simultaneous presence of 
other factors, which make up a sufficient condition together with the changes. These 
other factors include a number of those we identified in the second section of this article, 
especially public pressure (in the form of a degree of electoral ‘mobility’) and an 
‘appropriate’ political culture. In relation to the Italian case itself, however, while our 
findings incline us towards a pessimistic view of the future of anti-corruption efforts in 
that country, we should be wary of accepting such a view too easily. After less than ten 
years and only three elections, the new bipolar party system is hardly consolidated and 
competing coalitions with stable party memberships and regular alternation in office have 
not yet had a chance to emerge as enduring features of Italy’s political system. If, with 
time, such features do emerge, then it may be that they will favour anti-corruption efforts 
in the longer run. This suggests that it will be worth keeping the Italian case under 
observation, and that the future may at some stage oblige us to revise our conclusions 
about the impact of institutional change. 
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